Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 14
Issue 1 Winter 1981

Article 2

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review
Procedure: A Quest for Clarity
William C. Georges

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Georges, William C. (1981) "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure: A Quest for Clarity," Cornell International Law
Journal: Vol. 14: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol14/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
REVIEW PROCEDURE: A QUEST FOR
CLARITY* t
William C. Georges t

Since its enactment in December 1977, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act' (FCPA) has been a source of widespread controversy
and confusion. Critics in both government and the private sector
have assailed the FCPA's vague language and sparse legislative
history. They allege that the statute's ambiguities are causing many
companies to forego possibly legitimate business opportunities to
ensure compliance with the Act's provisions. 2 Some companies are
even withdrawing from certain foreign markets altogether. 3 As a
consequence, U.S. firms are losing millions of dollars in overseas
business, thus compounding the United States' balance-of-payments

problems.
*

4
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t An earlier, unpublished version of this Article was awarded the 1980 EdgertonRothstein International Affairs Prize by the Cornell Law School.
tt A.B. 1976, Stanford University; J.D. and Certificate of Specialization in
International Legal Affairs 1980, Cornell Law School.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. III 1979)) [hereinafter
cited as FCPA]. In essence, the Act makes it illegal for U.S. companies to bribe foreign
government officials, political parties or political candidates in order to influence official
actions or decisions affecting the payor's business. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a)
(Supp. III 1979). In addition, the Act requires issuers of securities to maintain certain
records and accounting controls to prevent the concealing of questionable domestic and
foreign payments. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 1979).
2. Interagency Export Disincentives Task Force, Report on Export Disincentives 8
(Feb. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Report on Export Disincentives] (unpublished report on
file at the Cornell International Law Journal). The Task Force, established by the
National Security Council after President Carter's U.S.'Export Policy Statement of
September 1978, was designed to "examine export disincentives and the ways in which
their impact on exports might by lessened." Id at 1. Participants in the Task Force
included: the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, and Labor;
the Office of Management and Budget; the Council of Economic Advisors; and
representatives of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. Id See notes 19-29 infra and accompanying text.
3. Singer, The Crackdown on Improper CorporatePaymentsMade Abroad, 10 NAT'L
J. 880, 880 (1978). See notes 19-29 infra and accompanying text.
4. Draft Working Paper on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for Consideration by
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In an effort to address these criticisms, the Justice Department,

which shares enforcement responsibility for the Act with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 5 promulgated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure in March 1980 to
provide guidance to companies on the meaning, scope, and
application of the Act's anti-bribery provisions.6 Under the Review
Procedure, a party concerned about violating the Act may submit
details of a prospective transaction to the Criminal Division for
review. After examining the proposed conduct, the Criminal
Division will issue a review letter advising the party of its
enforcement intentions under the FCPA if the transaction proceeds
further.

7

While many applaud the Justice Department's effort to provide
guidance on the Act, the Review Procedure has been criticized for
being inadequate to the task. Problems such as the confidentiality of
business information, the public nature of the review process, and
the SEC's refusal to participate in review proceedings have deterred

companies from using the Review Procedure.8 Justice Department
demands for more detailed descriptions of transactions, the

insufficiency of foreign lawyers' legal opinions, and translation
problems have greatly delayed action on those review requests that
have been submitted. 9 One year after the Review Procedure was
instituted, Justice has issued only four review letters.' 0
White House Export Task Force (June 7, 1979), reprinted in 262 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) M-1 (June 19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft Working
Paper]. See notes 19-29 infra and accompanying text.
5. The Justice Department has criminal enforcement responsibility for section 103
of the Act and civil and criminal enforcement responsibility for section 104, the Act's
anti-bribery provisions. The SEC is responsible for the accounting provision of section
102 and for civil enforcement actions under section 103. See Shine, The Antibribery
Propisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, II THE NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs ACT 3, 4-5 (R. Beckler, A. Levenson, R.
Shine co-chairmen 1980) [hereinafter cited as NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE II].
6. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to
be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18).
7. Dep't of Justice Release (March 24, 1980). The Justice Department will only
declare its enforcement intentions under sections 103 or 104, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2
(Supp. III 1979). The Review Procedure is not available for questions concerning the
record-keeping and accounting requirements of section 102 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(Supp. III 1979). See note 5 supra.
8. See notes 136-66 infra and accompanying text.
9. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-II (July 9, 1980).
10. On October 29, 1980, the Justice Department responded to four review requests
in the form of published releases. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Review Procedure Releases Nos. 80-01 to 80-04 (Oct. 29, 1980) (on file at the Cornell
InternationalLawJournal). See 331 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) A3 (Nov. 4, 1980). The Department stated that it would take no enforcement action in
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Given the increasing importance of international commerce to

the U.S. economy, it is imperative that a workable process exist for
clarifying the FCPA. This Article examines whether the FCPA
Review Procedure is such a process. The Article first considers the
need for clarification of the Act and traces the events that led to the
establishment of the Review Procedure. An overview of the
Procedure is presented and its effectiveness in meeting the problems
of the Act is evaluated. The Article then suggests changes in the

Review Procedure and proposes an alternative method of providing
guidance to the business community.
I
NEED FOR CLARIFICATION

The legal and business communities have been nearly unanimous in their, complaint that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
riddled with vagueness and ambiguity." The Act's provisions are
deceptively concise, with key words and phrases defined in neither
the Act itself nor its legislative history. Some of the statute's most
blatant ambiguities include: (1) what duties of foreign government
employees are "essentially ministerial or clerical;"' 2 (2) the extent to
three of the four review releases. In the fourth case, Justice officials declined to respond
to the review request. See notes 109-21 infra and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON EXPORT
PROMOTION FUNCTIONS AND POTENTIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVES 9-3 to 9-8 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT]; Report on Export Disincentives, supra
note 2, at 7; The Anti-Bribery Bill Backfires, BUSINESS WEEK, April 17, 1978, at 143;
Singer, Businesses Seek Guidance on Foreign Bribery Law, 10 NAT'L J.1864 (1978); Estey
& Marston, Pitfalls(andLoopholes) in the ForeignBribery Law, FORTUNE, Oct. 9, 1978,
at 182.
12. It is clear from both the language of the Act and its legislative history that the
ban on payments to foreign officials does not extend to payments to those "whose duties
are essentially ministerial or clerical." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. III
1979). Congress did not intend to prohibit "grease" payments or facilitating payments
made to low-level government employees to secure the prompt and proper performance
of actions to which the payor is entitled. H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., IstSess. (1977),
reprintedin 186 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) N-6 to N-7 (Dec. 13,
1977) (statements of Sen. Tower on the floor of the Senate prior to passage). What is not
clear is which employees perform "essentially ministerial or clerical" duties. The Act's
legislative history speaks vaguely of nondiscretionary actions, permits and licenses, citing
few examples of specific positions. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977). In
addition, while an employee such as a customs agent may perform only ministerial duties
in one country, the powers of his counterpart in another country may be much broader.
Though companies may consult foreign lawyers or commercial officers at U.S. embassies
to determine the nature and scope of a government employee's duties, their advice will
not offer immunity against a contrary determination by the Justice Department. Estey &
Marston, supra note 11, at 184.
To further complicate matters, though grease payments are exempt under the FCPA,
the Justice Department has indicated that it may prosecute some payments under earlier
enacted anti-bribery laws. Id See note 96 infra and accompanying text. As one Justice
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which the word "corruptly" protects business entertainment of foreign officials and courtesy gifts;' 3 (3) under what circumstances a
company has "reason to know" that a sales agent or other intermediofficial stated, the Department "'hasn't felt absolutely bound by the intent of Congress.'" 207 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) A-6 (May 16, 1978) (statement of Richard W. Beckler, then Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section, Criminal Division,
U.S. Dep't of Justice). Thus even if a company has carefully assured itself that its actions
fall within the grease payments exception of the FCPA, it may still be prosecuted. Such a
possibility makes the value of legal planning tenuous at best.
Further, while Congress did not place limits on the amount paid to ministerial or clerical employees, the Justice Department may infer that large sums are intended to be
passed on to higher officials. Thus to avoid investigation, businessmen must consider not
only the recipients of payments but also the size of payments. How much is too much
would seem to depend on the services involved, the value of the business transaction, and
customary practice in the foreign country.
Perhaps the most troubling ambiguity in this area is whether facilitating payments
made to high level government officials are also exempt under the Act. In banning payments to foreign officials, the Act sets forth two tests. First, the payments must be
intended to assist a company in "obtaining," "retaining" or "directing" business, and
second, they must be made to an official whose duties are not "essentially ministerial or
clerical." H.R. REP. No. 831, supra, reprintedin 186 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S.
Export Weekly) N-7 (Dec. 13, 1977) (statement of Sen. Tower). Thus the language of the
Act focuses both on the recipient of the payment and the purpose of the payment. As one
commentator concluded, "[Congress] apparently provided a loophole allowing grease
payments to be made to true foreign officials also." Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 57 HARV. Bus. REV. 32, 46 (1979). If the duty to be performed by the "true
foreign official" is not intended to obtain, retain or direct business, but merely to move a
matter more quickly toward an eventual act or decision, a facilitating payment made to
him would arguably be permitted under the FCPA.
While the language of the Act would seem to support this reasoning, a reading of its
legislative history can lead to a different conclusion. As one article suggests, in determining whether a payment to a particular person is excluded from the Act's prohibitions,
Congress intended the focus to be on the nature of the foreign official's job, not on the
particular act that he is paid to perform. Sprow & Benedict, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 Some PracticalProblems and Suggested Procedures, I CORP. L. REV.
357, 361 (1978). Under this interpretation, a payment made to a civil servant whose
duties involve the exercise of discretion would be unlawful even if the act he was paid to
perform was essentially ministerial or clerical.
This conclusion is supported by Senator Tower's statement on the floor of the Senate
prior to the passage of the FCPA: "We discussed the possibility of excluding payments
to secure the performance of 'essentially ministerial or clerical' duties, but rejected it in
favor of a test that would look to the type of officer involved-not to the particular duty
he was being asked to perform." H.R. REP. No. 831, supra,reprintedin 186 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) (U.S. Export Weekly) N-7 (Dec. 13, 1977). These inconsistencies between
the language of the Act and its legislative history have led some to wonder "whether a
large, corrupt payment to an official with ministerial duties is not prohibited while a
small payment to expedite processing customs forms is prohibited if made to a more
senior official." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11, at 9-6.
13. The legislative history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act contains very little
discussion of business entertainment expenditures and courtesy gifts. A literal reading of
the Act suggests that any entertainment of foreign officials or gifts to them would be
prohibited if intended to induce the foreign officials to use their positions in order to
direct business to the payor. Logically, there should be no distinction between the payment of a bribe in cash or in kind, as that would undermine the objectives of the Act.
But, as two commentators have concluded, it seems unlikely that Congress meant to
prohibit small gifts that are of insufficient value to induce a government official to misuse
his position, especially in countries where such gifts are customary or dictated by local
rules of etiquette. Sprow & Benedict, supra note 12, at 360. It seems equally doubtful
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ary is passing money on to a foreign official;' 4 (4) under what circumstances a company is liable for the acts of its officers, directors,
employees, agents, stockholders, subsidiaries or partners; 15 and (5)
that Congress meant to prohibit tours of company offices and factories-including transportation, hotels, meals and entertainment expenditures-in order to familiarize foreign
government officials with the company's production methods and facilities.
Some observers believe that this interpretation of the Act is supported by the use of the
word "corruptly" in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a) & 77dd-2(a) (Supp. III 1979). See, e.g.,
Sprow & Benedict, supra note 12, at 359; Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
Working Group on Overseas Business Practices, International Division, Statement of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States Regarding the Impact and Operation of
Section 103 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (June 30, 1980), at 9 [hereinafter cited as Statement of the Chamber of Commerce] (on file at the CornellInternational
Law Journal). As explained in the Act's legislative history, "[t]he word 'corruptly' is
used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to
induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to
the payor. . . . The word 'corruptly' connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to
wrongfully influence the recipient." S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977),
reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4098, 4108 (emphasis added). If the
gift or entertainment is customary or merely intended to create a pleasurable atmosphere
for discussions between a company and government officials, it is unlikely that this alone
would cause an official to "misuse" his position. Thus the Act would not seem to prohibit gifts and entertainment expenditures in these circumstances.
14. The provision of greatest concern to businessmen is the prohibition of payments
to any person "while knowing or having reason to know" that all or a portion of the
payment will be passed on to a foreign official, political party, party official or candidate.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added). See REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11, at 9-5. This clause prohibits indirect payments to

foreign officials through intermediaries such as consultants and sales agents, who sometimes pass on part of their fees to government officials in order to achieve a desired sale.
Local agents often play a critical role in obtaining business overseas, and in some countries the use of agents is required by law. Id.
The Act's legislative history does not intimate under what circumstances a company
should have "reason to know" that an agent is making illegal bribes. Companies fear
that in some countries where bribery is commonplace, "reason to know" will be presumed in all cases. Companies are uncertain about the extent of their obligation to investigate an agent's practices, and they are concerned about how much protection instituting
FCPA control procedures will provide them. Id. To ensure compliance with the FCPA,
many companies are requiring their sales agents to sign agreements in which they pledge
not to bribe foreign officials in their work for the company. See The Anti-Bribery Bill
Backfires,supra note 11, at 143. But, as the Justice Department has made clear, a mere
contract provision, without other affirmative precautionary steps, will not insulate a company from liability for its agents' improper actions. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Release No. 80-03 (Oct. 29, 1980). See note 121
infra and accompanying text.
15. Under the Act, both companies and their officers, directors, employees, agents
and stockholders acting in the company's behalf may be liable for violations of the antibribery provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. III 1979). The Act, however, does not make clear under what circumstances a company is liable for the actions of
low level employees who make unauthorized bribes to foreign officials. The Act and its
legislative history are similarly ambiguous on the subject of company liability for
improper payments by subsidiaries. By its terms, the Act's prohibition against bribery
does not extend to foreign subsidiaries of American companies. This is supported by
statements of the Act's sponsors. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), reprintedin 186 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (U.S.Export Weekly) N-5 (Dec. 13,
1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). But if a U.S. parent company benefits from a bribe
made by its foreign subsidiary and has knowledge that the bribe was made, it might still
be liable under the Act. It is arguable that the parent tacitly approved the bribe by not
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the application of the Act to contributions to political parties and

candidates. 16
These ambiguities in the FCPA are especially troublesome
because of the virtual absence of enforcement history under the
Act.17 Companies cannot look to court decisions as aids in interpreting the Act or to SEC or Justice actions to determine enforcement
policies. Companies are left in a legal void where commonplace
business transactions must be undertaken with uncertain legal foundation and subject to harsh civil and criminal penalties. Small companies and new exporters without access to specialized counsel
8
experienced in dealing with the Act are especially disadvantaged. '
Critics of the FCPA claim that its ambiguities have resulted in
significant losses in foreign sales, service and construction contracts.
They contend that many companies, for fear of violating the Act, are
intervening to stop its payment. See generally Baruch, supra note 12, at 48.
The liability of a company for the actions of joint venture partners and prime contractors is also unclear. If a company is a minority partner in a joint venture, it may be
unable to control the payment of bribes to foreign officials despite its best efforts to do so.
A similar problem faces subcontractors who have knowledge that the prime contractor is
bribing foreign officials. Whether a company could be found liable under the FCPA in
such circumstances is uncertain. Though a company would benefit from such a bribe, it
would have neither approved of nor acted directly or indirectly in furtherance of the
illegal payment. See generall, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note I1, at 9-3.
16. The FCPA forbids payments to foreign political parties, candidates and party
officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77dd-I(a)(2),
77dd-2(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). The Act does not proscribe legitimate contributions to
foreign political parties and candidates in countries where such contributions are legal.
Whether a payment would be legal or illegal under the Act therefore depends on the
intention of the payor. Unless the payor were motivated solely by an interest in the
general policies of the government or the strengthening of a particular political party, he
would be treading on dangerous ground.
What factors must be present to constitute a violation of the Act is unclear. Even
contributions with the best of motives may be made under circumstances that could
imply a corrupt purpose. The awarding of a major contract to a company that made a
substantial contribution to a political candidate might suggest an improper motive. If
this is enough to invite prosecution by the Justice Department, a company might be
advised to refrain from seeking government contracts either before or soon after an election. This, however, would put companies in the anamolous position of desiring the
election of a candidate for general political reasons but being financially penalized by his
success at the polls.
17. The Justice Department has brought only two civil actions and one criminal
action alleging violations of the FCPA. United States v. Carver, No. 79-1768 (S.D. Fla.,
filed April 9, 1979); United States v. Kenney, No. 79-2038 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 2, 1979);
United States v. Kenney Int'l Corp., No. 79-00372 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 2, 1979). The SEC
has filed only one civil injunctive action to enjoin violations of the Act's anti-bribery
provisions. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Katy Indus., No. C78-3476 (N.D. Ill.,
filed Aug. 30, 1978). See Securities Exchange Release No. 34-17099, Statement of Commission Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 45 Fed.
Reg. 59,001, 59,003 (1980).
18. See 126 CONG. REC. S5875 (daily ed. May 28, 1980) (statement of Sen. Chaffee
introducing S. 2763, a bill that would direct the Justice Department to provide compliance guidelines under the FCPA.) See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11, at
D-6.
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abandoning legitimate business practices that are essential in
obtaining foreign contracts. Other companies are foregoing certain
export-related opportunities, and some companies are withdrawing
altogether from markets in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East where they fear they may most easily overstep the Act's
ambiguous bounds. 19
In its preliminary report, the Interagency Task Force on Export
Disincentives confirmed that many U.S. companies are interpreting
the Act cautiously. 20 Export sales are generally a small proportion of
total sales for most American companies. This is especially true of
exports to less developed countries (LDCs), where FCPA problems
are most prevalent. Firms are thus reluctant to risk large penalties
under the FCPA when there is any question of the legality of a particular transaction. 21 Rather than expose themselves to possible civil
and criminal liability, firms often simply refrain from entering such
uncertain export dealings.
Businessmen emphasize that the limited number of prosecutions
brought under the Act does not reflect the extent of the deterrent
effect on export transactions caused by ambiguities in the FCPA.
The risk of successful prosecution is not the only concern. Companies fear the mere possibility of being charged with FCPA violations
22
because of the adverse publicity such charges would engender.
Even when convinced that a court would find no violation of the
Act, some firms may forego export opportunities because of a concern that the Justice Department or SEC might interpret the Act dif23
ferently and bring an enforcement action against them.
Concerns over ambiguities in the FCPA appear to be having a
major effect on U.S. exports. 24 While most sources have been reluctant to attempt to quantify the extent of losses caused by the
19. See generaly REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11 at 10, 9-1 to 9-11, C-3,
C-6 to C-14, D-6; Report on Export Disincentives, supra note 2, at 7-8; U.S. Firms Say
'77 Ban on Foreign Payments Hurts OverseasSales, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1979, at 1, col. 6;
Singer, supra note 3, at 880-81; Butterfield, U.S Law 4gainst Bribes Blamedfor Millions
in Lost Sales in Asia, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at 1, cols. 5-6. [Editor's Note: As this
Article went to press, the General Accounting Office released the results of a survey it
conducted of 250 U.S. companies doing business abroad. More than 30% of the companies reported that they had lost overseas business as a result of the FCPA. In the aircraft
and construction industries, over 50% of the respondents reported losses. New Survey on
Anti-Bribery Laws, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 7, 1981, at 46, col 1.]
20. Report on Export Disincentives, supra note 2, at 8.
21. Id at9.
22. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11, at 9-3.
23. Id
24. Nineteen American embassies have reported that the Act is having a negative

impact on U.S. trade.

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT,

supra note 11, at C-3. Foreign Serv-

ice posts in eight LDCs, accounting for $6.5 billion in U.S. exports in 1978, perceived
some negative export effects. Posts in seven LDCs, accounting for $7 billion in exports,
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FCPA,25 a draft working paper of the Interagency Task Force on
Export Disincentives placed the amount at about $1 billion annually. 26 Other reports, however, suggest that this significantly under27
estimates losses caused by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
While there is substantial evidence that the FCPA has caused

trade losses, it is impossible to determine how much is attributable to
ambiguity in the law and how much is due instead to genuinely pro-

hibited bribery. This distinction is central to any analysis of proposals that seek to minimize the adverse impact of the FCPA. For while
providing guidance to businessmen may reduce losses due to ambi-

guity in the law regarding facilitating payments or entertainment
expenditures, only an amendment or repeal of the Act would prevent
those losses due to a firm's inability to bribe foreign government officials. Complaints of some businessmen and government officials
suggest that it is the latter problem that is the primary cause of lost
overseas business. 28 But a Commerce Department study found that

many businessmen and attorneys believe that uncertainty concerning
the meaning of the Act has a far greater impact on exports than the

actual prohibition against bribery. 29 An effective means of clarifying
the Act's ambiguous provisions should thus significantly reduce
trade losses.

perceived significant negative export effects. Report on Export Disincentives, supra note
2, at 9.
25. As the preliminary report of the Interagency Task Force on Export Disincentives
explained, it is impossible to estimate precisely the costs of export disincentives. Report
on Export Disincentives, supra note 2, at 4. Estimates must be based primarily on incomplete, anecdotal, and often unverifiable information. The effect of export disincentives
generally cannot be separated from other factors causing changes in U.S. trade. In addition, firms studied were often unable or unwilling to provide sufficient details to permit
authentication of cases. Id Also, the Task Force found that the FCPA had been in
effect for too short a period of time to permit meaningful analysis of trade data. The
Task Force cautioned, however, that "lack of specific estimates ... must not be mistaken for insignificance." Id at 8.
26. Draft Working Paper, supra note 4, at M-1. Of this amount, $400 million is in
one country alone. Id
27. A Saudi businessman who has represented American companies claims that the
FCPA prevented U.S. manufacturers from winning a $3 billion communications contract. Singer, supra note 3, at 881. A 1978 study by Neil H. Jacoby, Peter Nehemkis and
Richard Eells estimated that an annual loss ofjust five percent of U.S. businesses abroad
would cost $6 billion in sales and 120,000 jobs. Id But a study by Barry Richman of
sixty-five major U.S. companies found that only nine lost more than one percent of their
total foreign sales by stopping questionable foreign payments and only one company lost
more than five percent of its foreign sales. Id
28. See, e.g., Butterfield, supra note 19, at 1,cols. 5-6; Telephone interview with Peter
Clark, Staff Attorney, Multinational Fraud Branch, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 5, 1981).
29. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11, at 9-3.
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II
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
A.

THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE

The government has not been unresponsive to complaints about
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In 1978, the Carter Administration's Export Policy Task Force recommended to the President that
the Justice Department issue guidelines to clarify the law. 30 In his
statement of the Administration's new export policy, President
Carter approved the recommendation and publicly announced his
intention to provide guidance on the FCPA:
At my direction, the Justice Department will provide guidance to the business community concerning its enforcement priorities under the recently
enacted foreign anti-bribery statute. This statute should not be viewed as an
impediment to the conduct of legitimate business activities abroad. I am
hopeful that American business will not forego legitimate export opportunities because of uncertainty about the application of this statute. The guid31
ance provided by the Justice Department should be helpful in that regard.

The President's directive reportedly followed an intense controversy between the Commerce and State Departments on the one
hand and the Justice Department and Securities and Exchange
Commission on the other.32 Commerce and State were sympathetic
to the complaints of the business community and recommended that
the Justice Department provide guidance. Justice and the SEC,
however, opposed any form of guidance. 33 They argued that any
new criminal law always contains ambiguities and it is the duty of
the courts, not administrative agencies, to interpret the law as individual cases are adjudicated. 34 Guidance by the Justice Department
or the SEC would only provide a roadmap around the FCPA.35
30. Singer, supra note 11, at 1864.
31. Statement of the President on United States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 1631, 1633-34 (Oct. 2, 1978).
32. Berry, Justiceis Reluctant Guide on New Bribe Legislation, Washington Post, Oct.
10, 1978, § D, at 7, col. 2.
33. Id.; Singer, supra note 11, at 1864.
34. Id at 1865 (statement of Richard W. Beckler, then Deputy Chief of the Justice
Department's Criminal Division, Fraud Section).
35. Taubman, U.S. Seen ClarifyingBribery Law, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1979, § D, at
6, cols. 4-6. A Justice Department official frankly stated the position of many at the
Department: "All [businessmen] want to know is who they can bribe and who they can't.
Well, we're not going to tell them-we'll go down kicking and screaming on this one."
Berry, supra note 32, § D, at 7, col. 3. Stanley Sporkin, Director of the SEC's Enforcement Division, offered a similar perspective: "We don't have guidelines for rapists, muggers, and embezzlers, and I don't think we need guidelines for corporations who want to
bribe foreign officials." Taubman, supra, § D, at 6, col. 4.
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Surprisingly, a large segment of the business community also
opposed the President's directive, at least publicly. 36 Some businessmen stated that they did not find the provisions of the FCPA
troublesome and therefore clarification was unwarranted. 37 Others,
who did not find the law ambiguous, feared that clarification of the
law might make it harder for them to do business abroad. Many
believed that the Justice Department would interpret the Act restric38
tively.
Congressional reaction to the President's directive was mixed.
Opponents of guidance claimed that only Congress can authorize
clarification of a law, and Congress did not authorize the Executive
Branch to provide administrative guidance or to comment on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 39 Conversely, Senator William
Proxmire, the chief sponsor of the FCPA in the Senate, stated that
while any changes in the Act must be made by Congress, he hoped
that "the Justice Department and the SEC will be able to work out a
procedure which enforces the FCPA and provides predictability so
that legitimate trade transactions can go forward. '40
B.

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DELIBERATIONS

Though reluctant to follow the President's directive, the Justice
Department began deliberations on how best to resolve the statute's
ambiguities. Over the ensuing months, the Department considered
five means of providing guidance to the business community under
the Act:41 (1) an information pamphlet for businessmen;4 2 (2)
36. See Singer, supra note 11, at 1865. Because corporate bribery evokes such negative public reaction, many companies have publicly tried to disassociate themselves from
the problems of the FCPA, even though they, too, would prefer some guidance under the
Act. Telephone interviews with members of the District of Columbia bar (Sept. 1979).
See notes 152-53 infra and accompanying text.
37. Singer, supra note 11, at 1864-65; Telephone interview with Peter Clark, Staff
Attorney, Multinational Fraud Branch, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 5,
1981). Based upon comments he has received from the private bar, Mr. Clark attributes
the small number of FCPA review requests received by the Justice Department to the
absence of significant ambiguity in the Act.
38. Singer, supra note 11, at 1864-65.
39. Taubman, supra note 35, § D, at 6, col. 5.
40. Letter from Senator William Proxmire to then Attorney General Griffin Bell
(April 26, 1979) (letter on file at the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal). Senator
Proxmire stated further that "... a business review procedure on a case by case basis
would appear to serve the business community's need for predictability and [be] an
appropriate administrative tool. On the other hand, guidelines or enforcement priorities
are likely to accomplish little more than provide a roadmap around the FCPA." Id
41. See generally Shine & Mendelson, Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Background;
Pre-FCPA Prosecutions; FCPA Review Procedure, THE NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 458, 463 (R. Beckler, A. Levenson, R.
Shine co-chairmen 1980) [hereinafter cited as NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE I].

42. Telephone interview with Richard S. Shine, Chief, Multinational Fraud Branch,
Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Sept. 23, 1980).

1981]

FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE

detailed regulations, similar to the Commerce Department's
antiboycott regulations; 43 (3) an official compendium of hypothetical
cases under the Act, modeled after the Antitrust Division's Guide to
International Operations;"4 (4) a listing of enforcement priorities,
resembling that of the Antitrust Division;45 and (5) a business review
46
procedure, again modeled after that of the Antitrust Division.
An information pamphlet for businessmen was viewed as perhaps the least useful of the five options. As conceived, the pamphlet
would have included a brief explanation of the Act's provisions in
non-legal terms. Though such a pamphlet would have been easy for
the Justice Department to write, Department officials believed that
the pamphlet would not provide the kind of substantive guidance on
the Act mandated by the President's Export Policy Statement, and
thus would not be very helpful to the business community. 47
Detailed regulations, 48 advocated by some lawyers and businessmen, 49 would provide one of the most effective means of clarifying the Act. By defining precisely such terms as "ministerial or
clerical" and by delineating the scope of permissible business
entertainment expenditures, regulations would resolve many of the
FCPA's ambiguities. Justice Department officials, however, believed
that promulgating regulations was not an appropriate function.
First, the FCPA is not subject to useful generalizations. Based on
the Department's limited experience in pre-FCPA investigations, it
found situations from country-to-country so varied that rules on, for
example, which government employees perform essentially ministerial or clerical duties, could not be given world-wide application. 50
43. The Commerce Department's antiboycott regulations appear at 15 C.F.R. § 369
(1980).
44. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE]. See generally Grif-

fin, A Critiqueof the Justice Department'sAntitrust GuideforInternationalOperations, 11
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215 (1978); Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoinder, 11
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255 (1978).
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968).
46. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1979).
47. Telephone interview with Richard S. Shine, note 42 supra.
48. The distinction made in this discussion between regulations and compendiums of
hypotheticals is somewhat misleading. Though different in name, the two means of
guidance are not always exclusive in form. The antiboycott regulations, note 43 supra,
for example, include hypothetical illustrations. Thus, many of the advantages and criticisms of regulations may also apply to hypotheticals, and vice versa. See generally notes
179-87 infra and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., letter from the law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue to Mr. George
Fitzsimmons, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (June 30, 1980) (submitted in response to the SEC's request for comments on the impact of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA) (on file at the CornellInternationalLaw Journal). See note 141
infra.
50. Telephone interview with Richard S. Shine, note 42 supra.

68

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURXAL

[Vol. 14:57

In addition, Justice officials were reluctant to write regulations without case law on which to base their interpretations of the Act.51
Finally, as one official noted, the Department did not intend to narrow the scope of the Act, which is what most advocates of regula52
tions hoped it would do.
Some Justice Department officials advocated a compendium of
hypotheticals because, unlike a business review procedure, it avoids
high costs and bureaucratic snags. 53 Like regulations, hypotheticals
do not require companies to publicly reveal their proposed transactions.5 4 Some Department officials believed, however, that hypotheticals were potentially misleading in the context of actual business
transactions.5: One official asserted that the FCPA might be "too
complex an area of law" for this type of procedure. 56 Further, many
believed that, as in the case of regulations, the Department lacked
sufficient enforcement experience under the Act to write authoritative and realistic hypotheticals and interpretations. 57 The Antitrust
Division Guide to International Operations, in contrast, was written
after many years of enforcement experience and is supported by cita58
tions to specific court decisions.
The Department of Justice ultimately chose a listing of enforcement priorities and a business review procedure. Many in the
Department initially viewed publication of enforcement priorities as
one of the least desirable of the five options.5 9 They feared that a
statement of enforcement priorities would undermine the govern'60
ment's enforcement efforts by providing a "roadmap for fraud.
The President's Export Policy Statement, however, specifically
directed the Justice Department to provide guidance to the business
community on its enforcement priorities under the FCPA. 6 1 Faced
with this mandate, Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann,
in a December 1979 speech, announced the kinds of cases the Criminal Division considers the most urgent and egregious.6 2 The highest
51. Id
52. Id
53. DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) G-9 (June 28, 1979).
54. Id
55. Telephone interview with Richard S. Shine, note 42 supra.
56. DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) G-9 (June 28, 1979).
57. Telephone interview with Richard S. Shine, note 42 supra.
58. ANTITRUST GUIDE, note 44 supra.
59. DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) G-9 (June 28, 1979).
60. Id See notes 35 & 40 supra and accompanying text.
61. Statement of the President on United States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 1631, 1633 (Oct. 2, 1978).
62. Speech of Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, entitled The Justice
Department's Proposed Program to Provide Advice to Businesses in Connection with
Foreign Payments, in New York City (Nov. 8, 1979), at 15, excerpts reprintedin NEW

1981]

FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE

priority cases include: bribery of foreign officials in markets where
all competitors are American; bribes made in markets where Americans are the only companies engaged in corrupt practices; bribes
made in countries where the local government is attempting to clean
up corrupt business practices; and bribery of foreign cabinet officers
and other high ranking officials. 63 Heymann emphasized that an
enforcement priority is merely a generalized statement of policy.
The business review procedure is the way to determine whether a
particular transaction will escape Justice Department enforcement
activities. 64
The business review procedure is the cornerstone of the Justice
Department's guidance program. The principal advantage of a business review procedure is that it offers the most certain way to determine the government's position on the application of the FCPA to a
particular course of action. 65 A business review procedure is especially helpful in clarifying "hard" cases, something other forms of
guidance may be unable to do. A review procedure is also a very
effective way of clarifying recurrent problems, such as whether the
duties of a particular government employee with whom a firm frequently deals are "ministerial or clerical." Justice Department officials believed that this option would meet the needs of the business
community while still providing the government the necessary
66
flexibility to interpret the Act on a case-by-case basis.
The Justice Department first circulated a draft of its proposed
business review procedure in September 1979. The draft met with
extreme skepticism from the legal and business communities, and
published reports were highly critical of it.67 Over the next six
months, Justice Department officials met with concerned parties to
REVIEW PROCEDURE I, supra note 41, at 467 (speech on file at the CornellInternational
Law Journal).
63. Id Heymann identified five other factors affecting the likelihood of prosecution:
(1) the size of the payment and the size of the economic transaction that the payment
affects; (2) the past conduct of the violator, (3) involvement, either actively or passively,
of a senior management official; (4) involvement of a lower-level employee where the
company has been less than diligent in monitoring employee activities; and (5) the
strength of available evidence and the chances for obtaining additional needed evidence.
Id at 16-18.
64. Id at 15.
65. DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) G-9 (June 28, 1979).
66. Id As Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeney stressed, individual
review is "less misleading [than written guidelines] and creates less problems for us."
The Procedure will allow Justice to "implement the procedures without interfering with
[its] law enforcement function." Quotedin Marcus,Agency to Help Businesses Obey Corrupt PracticesAct, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 8, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
67. See, e.g., Hager, FCPA Review: Unattractiveon its Face, Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 1, 1979, at I, col. 2.
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try to resolve some of the proposal's major infirmities. 68 These discreating the new Foreign Corrupt
cussions resulted in regulations 69
Practices Act Review Procedure.

III
THE FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE
A.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REVIEW PROCEDURE

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure is in
many ways similar to the Antitrust Division's Business Review Procedure. Under the FCPA Procedure, the Criminal Division, upon

receiving a request for review of a proposed transaction, may (1)
state its present enforcement intention under sections 103 and 104 of
the Act with respect to the proposed business conduct; 70 (2) decline
to state its present enforcement intention; 7 1 or (3) take such other

position or action as it considers appropriate. 72 The Criminal Divi73
sion may also, in its discretion, refuse to consider a review request.
The subject of the review request must be an actual transaction,

but the request need not involve only proposed conduct. The Criminal Division, however, will only consider a request for clearance of

involve proposed conduct; it
that portion of the transaction that does
74
will not comment on past conduct.
Review requests must be specific and "contain in detail all relevant and material information bearing on the conduct for which
review is requested and on the circumstances of the proposed con-

duct."' 75 An appropriate senior officer with operational responsibility for the relevant transaction must sign the review request.

Further, the chief executive officer of a requesting firm must desig68. Such problems included: the possibility of prosecution under other statutes; the
publication of entire review requests and review letters; the lack of assurance of confidentiality of sensitive information; the requirement that the requesting company's chief executive officer sign the review request; the sixty day response time to review requests; and
the requirement that the whole transaction under review be prospective. Lempert, Fraud
Unit Proposes Changes to Allay Fears on FCPA Review, Legal Times of Washington,
Feb. 4, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
69. Order Establishing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure, 45 Fed.
Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18).
70. Id. § 50.18(h). See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Review Procedure Releases Nos. 80-01, 80-02, 80-04 (Oct. 29, 1980). See notes 109-17
infra and accompanying text.
71. 75 Fed Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(h)). See U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Release No. 80-03
(Oct. 29, 1980). See notes 118-21 infra and accompanying text.
72. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(h)).
73. Id § 50.18(d).
74. Id § 50.18(b).
75. Id § 50.18(f).
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nate that person as the signatory. In appropriate cases, the chief
executive officer may be required to sign the request himself.76 The
person signing the review request must certify that it contains a
"true, correct and complete disclosure" with respect to the proposed
77
conduct.
Requesting parties must provide the Criminal Division with
"any additional information or documents the Division may thereafter request in order to review a matter." 78 Any information furnished orally must be confirmed in writing and certified by the same
person who signed the review request. 79 The Criminal Division may
also conduct whatever independent investigation it believes necessary. 80 After receipt of the review request and any additional documents, the Criminal Division will make "every reasonable effort" to
respond to a review request within thirty days. 8'
Unlike the Antitrust Division Review Procedure,82 review letters issued under the FCPA Review Procedure are binding upon the
Criminal Division. 83 To be binding, a review letter must be signed
by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division or his delegate. Oral statements limiting the enforcement dis84
cretion of the Department are unauthorized and nonbinding.
Further, review letters are binding only as to parties joining the
request. 85 The requesting party may rely upon a review letter to the
extent that disclosure is accurate, complete and continues accurately
to reflect circumstances after the date the review letand completely
86
ter is issued.
76. Id

77. Id
78. Id § 50.18(g).
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id § 50.18(i).
82. "A business review letter states only the enforcement intention of the [Antitrust]
Division as of the date of the letter, and the Division remains completely free to bring
whatever action or proceeding it subsequently comes to believe is required by the public
interest." Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9) (1979).
83. Since the Criminal Division had not yet established the goodwill enjoyed by the
Antitrust Division under its review procedure, authorities felt that an explicit and binding assurance of nonenforcement intentions was necessary under the FCPA. Speech of
Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, supra note 62, at 11. Although the Antitrust Division is not bound by a review letter, "the Division has never exercised its right
to bring a criminal action where there has been full and true disclosure at the time of
presenting the request." 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9) (1979)
84. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.186)).

85. Id § 50.18(e).

86. Id § 50.18(k). In all three Justice Department releases where the Department
determined to take no enforcement action, the following proviso appeared:
The FCPA Review Letter and this Release have no application to any party
which did not join in the request, and can be relied upon by the requesting parties only to the extent that the disclosure of facts and circumstances in the request
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A review letter, however, will not bind or obligate any other

agency. 87 Thus, the Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, could still bring a civil enforcement action against a party subject to its jurisdiction under section 103 of the Act for a transaction
already cleared by the Criminal Division. The SEC, however, has

stated that, on an interim basis, it will not take enforcement action
alleging violations of section 103 against any party that has received
clearance under the Review Procedure prior to May 31, 1981.88 The

SEC did not, however, obligate itself to refrain from enforcing the
Act's accounting and record-keeping requirements. 89 The Review

Procedure anticipates the possibility of such SEC enforcement and
warns that a review letter shall not "in any way alter the responsibil-

ity of the party or parties to comply with the accounting requirements of section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." 90 For
parties not subject to SEC jurisdiction, 9' however, clearance by the
Criminal Division would "provide 92 complete protection from
enforcement action" under the FCPA.
A review letter, though, will not foreclose Justice Department

prosecution under other laws, unless "specifically cited in the particular review letter."' 93 The Department has agreed not to use the
"Kerner mail fraud theory" 94 to reach conduct not covered by the
is accurate and complete and continues to accurately and completely reflect such
facts and circumstances.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Releases Nos. 80-01, 80-02, 80-04 (Oct.
29, 1980). See notes 109-17 infra and accompanying text.
87. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(l)).
88. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-17099, supra note 17, at 59,002. By May
31, 1981, the Justice Department is expected to have completed a study of the first year of
operation of the Review Procedure. Id at 59,005. After evaluating the Department's
findings, the Commission will reconsider its enforcement position and decide whether to
continue its present policy, participate in the Review Procedure, or take other steps. Id
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 1979).
90. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(m)).
91. The SEC does not have jurisdiction over "domestic concerns" under section 104
of the FCPA. Dep't of Justice Release (March 24, 1980), at 2. See generall, Speech of
Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, supra note 62, at 11. The term "domestic concern" is defined as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national or resident of the United States; or
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a
State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the
United States.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
92. Dep't of Justice Release (March 24, 1980), at 2.
93. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(l)).
94. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149-50 (7th Cir.), cer. denied sub
no. United States v. Kerner, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). The Kerner mail fraud theory was
used in the Isaacs case to find mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) for use of the
mails in the bribery of Otto Kerner, then governor of Illinois, on the ground that the
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FCPA; it has no desire to "sandbag" business.9 5 Nevertheless, a Jus-

tice official warned that the Department would make no hands-off
promises concerning violations of currency and export declaration

been used in the past to attack questionable forstatutes, which have
96
eign payments.

An important element of the Review Procedure is the public
release of information describing the identity of the party or parties
submitting a review request, the general nature and circumstances of

the proposed conduct, and the Criminal Division's enforcement

decision. 97 By publicizing the core of individual review requests and

its decisions on them, the Criminal Division hopes to provide some
guidance to the business community at large. While the Division

would be bound only with respect to the requesting party, it wants to
disseminate information about review transactions in order to give

companies contemplating similar activities some predictability as to
what the Justice Department is willing to sanction. 98
Because some parties may wish to keep some or all of the infor-

mation supplied to the Criminal Division confidential, the Review
Procedure includes a provision whereby a party may ask the Division "to delay or to refrain from ever making publicly available parts

of a review request, and part or all of any information or documents
submitted in support of the review request." 99 To avoid public disState of Illinois and its citizens were defrauded of the honest and faithful services of the
governor. 493 F.2d at 1150. This same theory has been attempted in a case involving the
bribery of a foreign official on the ground that the foreign country's citizens have been
deprived of their right to the honest and loyal services of their government officials in the
performance of their official duties. See United States v. Control Data Corp., No. 7800210 (D.D.C., filed April 26, 1978). A copy of the information filed by the U.S. Attorney in this case is reprinted in NEw REVIEW PROCEDURE II, supra note 5, at 177.
95. See Lempert, supra note 68, at 1. To guarantee this promise, the Justice Department will amend the U.S. Attorney's Manual to direct local prosecutors not to bring such
cases. Lempert, Bar Awaits First FCPA Review Letters, Legal Times of Washington,
March 31, 1980, at 2, col. 2. Mail fraud or wire fraud counts, however, may still be
joined with FCPA counts. Lempert, supra note 68, at 1.
96. Id. Prosecutions have been brought for pre-FCPA activity under 31 U.S.C.
§§ 1058, 1059, 1101-1 105 (1976) (transporting currency in excess of $5,000 into or out of
the United States without proper reporting); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (making false statements to a government official). See, e.g., United States v. Control Data Corp., No. 7800210 (D.D.C., filed April 26, 1978); United States v. Galfstream American Corp., No.
79-00007 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 3, 1979); United States v. Lockheed Corp., No. 79-00270
(D.D.C., filed June 1, 1979). Other statutes that may be used to attack bribery of foreign
officials include the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976); the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976); and the Internal Revenue Code,
I.R.C. § 7201 (improperly deducting foreign payments as a business expense).
97. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(o)(2)).
98. See Hager, supra note 67, at 1.
99. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(o)(1)). This clause
provides for more confidentiality than that available under the Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure. The Antitrust Review Procedure only permits a request to delay
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closure, however, a party must: (1) specify precisely the information
that it asks not to be made public; (2) state the minimum period of
time during which nondisclosure is considered necessary; and (3)
justify the request for nondisclosure by showing that the material

consists of trade secrets or commercial and financial information
that is privileged and confidential under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), or is exempt under any other provision of FOIA. 00
In the past, the Justice Department has not guaranteed in

advance that information supplied to it would not be made publicly
available, even if exempt under the Freedom of Information Act. 01
The FCPA Review Procedure marks a major policy shift in this

regard by limiting the discretionary authority of the Department. If
the Justice Department determines that grounds for nondisclosure

exist, then it will not disclose the exempt material except in general
terms in the release describing the Criminal Division's enforcement

decision. This release, when exempt, will not disclose the identity of
the foreign country in which the proposed conduct is to take place,
the identity of any foreign sales agents, or other types of identifying

information. 0 2 This last catch-all category allows parties to argue

that disclosure of any fact will reveal the identity of the transaction
to their competitors. 0 3 Though the name of the requesting party

will generally be released, even this fact may be withheld if it would
enable competitors to pinpoint the transaction.1°4
If the Justice Department determines that grounds for nondis-

closure do not exist under the Freedom of Information Act, the
Department will notify the party submitting the FCPA review
request of its determination at least seven days before any informareleasing submitted information, not a request to refrain from ever making such information public. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(10)(c) (1979).
100. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(o)(1)). The Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure does not make reference to the Freedom of
Information Act. Instead, a request for nondisclosure must be justifed by showing that
"disclosure would have a detrimental effect upon the requesting party's operations or
relations with actual or potential customers, employees, suppliers (including suppliers of
credit), stockholders, or competitors." 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(10)(c)(3) (1979).
101. SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-I (March 26, 1980). Attorney General Griffin
Bell, in a letter to the heads of all federal departments and agencies, stated that "[t]he
government should not withhold documents unless it is important to the public interest to
do so, even if there is some arguable legal basis for the withholding." Letter of May 5,
1977, reprintedin 123 CoNG. REC. S7763 (daily ed. May 17, 1977).
102. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(o)(2)).
103. Lempert, Bar Awaits First FCPA Review Letters, Legal Times of Washington,
March 31, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
104. Id Of the first four review releases issued, two withheld the name of the requesting party. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure
Releases Nos. 80-01, 80-03 (Oct. 29, 1980).
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tion is released. 0 5 This seven day reprieve gives companies time to
seek judicial action to prevent disclosure of information sought to be
kept confidential.
A requesting party may withdraw a review request at any time.
The Criminal Division, however, remains free to submit such comments to the party as it deems appropriate and to take any action at
any time thereafter. 0 6 The Division also reserves the right to retain
documents and information submitted to it and to use them for "all
governmental purposes." 107 Pursuant to this provision, the Criminal
Division has indicated that the Justice Department will turn over
information received from the requesting parties to regulatory agencies if a senior representative of an agency submits a written request
for the information, and the Department determines that the request
is for a lawful (and not a frivolous) purpose.' 0 8

B.

THE FIRST REVIEW RELEASES

The Justice Department published its first review releases on
October 29, 1980. In Release Number 80-01,109 the Department
stated that it did not intend to take enforcement action against a U.S.
law firm seeking to do business in "a foreign country." The law firm
proposed to set up a $10,000 annual fund for the education and support of two adopted children of a foreign government official. The
official's position was essentially "ceremonial" and did not involve
"substantive decision-making responsibilities.""10 The children's
natural parents, who were employed by the foreign government,
were "not in a position to make or to influence official decisions that
would in any way benefit either the law firm or any corporations
which may contribute to the education fund, in their dealings with
the foreign government." " Since the law firm had not retained, nor
did it anticipate retaining any business as a result of the proposed
conduct, the Department stated that it did not presently intend to
take enforcement action with respect to the proposed conduct. Significantly, the Justice Department did not publish the name of the
law firm, the country, or the name or specific position of the "honor105. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(o)(1)).

106. Id § 50.18(p).

107. Id
108. Id; Surrey & Popkin, Review ProcedureLeast DesirableAspect of FCPA, Legal
Times of Washington, April 14, 1980, at 10, col. 1, 11 n.8.
109. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Release
No. 80-01 (Oct. 29, 1980).
110. Id
111. Id
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ary government official.""12
In Release Number 80-02,1 3 the U.S. firm of Castle & Cooke,
Inc. and two of its subsidiaries sought approval of an employee's
plan to seek election to the legislature of the foreign country in
which he worked. The employee wanted to continue working for the
corporation during the election, and if elected, while in office. The
request stated that this employee's position with the corporation did
not involve "any type of advocacy work or any type of representation before the government on the company's behalf."' 14 The political position was part-time, and most legislators in that country held
outside jobs. Based on the stipulation that the employee fully disclose his "continuing relationship with the corporation to his political party, the electorate and to the goverment," and that he agree
not to participate in legislative matters directly affecting his corporation, and based on the opinion of local counsel that the proposed
conduct did not violate the foreign country's laws, the Department
agreed not to bring enforcement action with respect to the proposed
conduct. 115
In a third request,"I6 the Lockheed Corporation and the Olayan
Group, a Saudi Arabian trading and investment company, proposed
to enter into an agreement with each other to do business with the
government of Saudi Arabia and with the Saudi Arabian Airlines
Corporation ("Saudia"). The two firms sought Justice Department
guidance on the FCPA implications of the fact that Olayan's chairman, Mr. Suliman S. Olayan, was also an outside director of Saudia.
After determining that Mr. Olayan had taken significant steps to disclose his joint affiliation, and to refrain from any action that might
cause Saudia or the government of Saudi Arabia to be influenced in
favor of Lockheed or the Olayan Group, the Department of Justice
declared its intention to take no enforcement action on the basis of
Mr. Olayan's joint affiliation. 17 Implicit in the review release, however, is the reservation that if Mr. Olayan uses his position to influence official action for the benefit of Lockheed or the Olayan Group,
the Justice Department would not be bound by this review decision.
112. Id It is probably reasonable to assume that the submitting party requested the
Justice Department not to disclose these facts. See notes 101-04 supra and accompanying text.
113. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Release
No. 80-02 (Oct. 29, 1980).
114. Id
115. Id
116. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Release
No. 80-04 (Oct. 29, 1980).
117. Id
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In a fourth case," 8 an unnamed U.S. firm sought approval of a
contract with a West African attorney in which the attorney stipulated that he would not make payments to foreign officials in his
work for the company. Pursuant to section 50.18(g) of the Review
Procedure,"19 "the Criminal Division sought additional facts and circumstances concerning the attorney's background and qualifications.'' 2o Since the contract and responses to Justice Department
inquiries did not "reflect any facts or circumstances which could reasonably cause concern about the application or possible violation of
the Act," the Department declined to respond to the review request.
The Department warned, however, that if in fact there were a reasonable concern, the mere contract provision, "without other affirmative precautionary steps," would not be sufficient to protect the
2
company from liability for the lawyer's actions.' '
IV
CRITICISMS OF THE REVIEW PROCEDURE
A.

GENERAL REACTION

The Review Procedure has not been received with overwhelming enthusiasm by either business or other government agencies or
departments. In fact, its development has been accorded only lukewarm praise within the Justice Department itself.' 22 As two commentators observed, the Justice Department "has selected the form
of guidance which is the least difficult for it to administer and the
23
most onerous for U.S. businessmen to seek."'
The SEC is concerned that the Review Procedure will help businesses circumvent the provisions of the Act and has thus refused to
participate in the review process.' 2 4 The Commission's principal
objection to the Procedure is that the application of the FCPA will,
118. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Release
No. 80-03 (Oct. 29, 1980).
119. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(g)).
120. The Release noted that the review request contained only the proposed contract
and a cover letter.
121. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Release
No. 80-03 (Oct. 29, 1980).
122. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Keeney refused to defend the draft Review
Procedure other than by noting "a perceived need in the administration to give some
guidance to the business community." Marcus, supra note 66, at 6.
123. Surrey & Popkin, supra note 108, at 10.
124. Marcus, supra note 66, at 6. The SEC's associate director of enforcement Theodore Levine warned that while the Antitrust Division offers a similar procedure, interpreting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act without impairing its effectiveness will be more
difficult. "Most antitrust decisions involve domestic situations where the facts are ascertainable. When you're dealing with a foreign transaction where the situation can be
much cloudier, it's a different story." 1d

78

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL L.W JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:57

in many cases, turn on judgments concerning motivation and intent.
These subjective questions, the Commission feels, do not easily lend
themselves to guidance on the basis of a written description of a pro.posed transaction. 25 Nevertheless, because many persons believed
that companies were deterred from submitting review requests as a
result of the SEC's refusal to participate in the review process,126 the
Commission announced in August 1980 that, on an interim basis, it
would not bring an enforcement action for bribery violations against
any party receiving clearance under the Review Procedure prior to
May 31, 1981.127
The Commerce Department, which originally recommended
both a business review procedure and a compendium of hypotheticals,' 28 believes that the Review Procedure alone will be inadequate.
In the view of the Department's general counsel, the Justice Department Review Procedure "doesn't provide enough in the way of
guidance to address the legitimate concerns and questions of the
business community about the application of the act."' 29 He
30
asserted that general guidelines are also needed.'
A spokesperson for the National Association of Manufacturers,
which opposed the adoption of any form of guidance, predicted that
the Review Procedure will not be used very much. The business
community will be reluctant to use the Procedure because of the Justice Department's authority to demand supporting documents.
Firms do not want Justice pouring over documents and information
that might be harmful to them. The spokesperson further indicated
that since review letters would likely be written in narrow terms,
clearance would be limited and thus would not give companies much
125. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16593, Impact of the Antibribery
Prohibitions in Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,574,
12,576 n.27 (1980). The Commission fails to note that the Review Procedure provides for
the submission of supporting documents and independent investigations by the Justice
Department of transactions under review. Thus the review process is not confined to the
examination of "a written description" of a proposed transaction. Further, the Commission would have to base actual enforcement decisions made outside the Review Procedure on much the same information.
126. See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
127. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-17099, supra note 17, at 59,002. See
note 88 supra and accompanying text.
128. General Counsel of the United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-Draft Guidance Materials (March 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Draft Guidance Materials] (on file at the CornellInternationalLaw Journal). The Commerce Department sent this recommendation to the Justice Department in a March 1979
memorandum. The memorandum included a draft business review procedure and a
draft set of substantive guidelines modeled after the Commerce Department's
antiboycott regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1980). Id
129. Marcus, supra note 66, at 6 (statement of C.L. Haslam, General Counsel, Dep't
of Commerce).
130. Id
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comfort. He predicted that the Review Procedure will only be used
in situations in which the legality of a transaction is totally
unclear. 131

The legal community has sounded similar complaints, though it
has offered a somewhat different perspective on the Procedure's use.
Lawyers generally agree that the Review Procedure will not be
widely used. 132 But many believe that companies will submit review
requests only when they are certain that the transaction will be
approved or when it is a close question, not when the legality of the
transaction is totally unclear. 133 Companies will use the Review Pro134
cedure to "cover" themselves, not to clarify troublesome issues.
As one lawyer explained, "if you do have a problem, you won't tell
' 135
the government because you know it will be investigated."

B.

DRAWBACKS OF THE REVIEW PROCEDURE

To be an effective form of guidance, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure must both be capable of resolving the
ambiguities in the FCPA and be of such a form that it is usable by
the business community. As presently conceived, the Review Procedure is lacking in both respects.
L

Resolution of Ambiguities

The FCPA Review Procedure is intended to clarify the ambiguities in the Act that have posed unintended obstacles to America's
foreign trade. 136 Theoretically, the Procedure achieves this goal by
doing two things: (1) it provides individual companies with a statement of the Justice Department's enforcement intentions under the
131. Telephone interview with a National Association of Manufacturers spokesperson
(Sept. 4, 1979).
132. See, e.g., Surrey & Popkin, note 108 supra; SEC Joins Review Plan, Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 15, 1980, at 10, col. 1; Huffman, Despite SEC Shift, Bar Still CautiousAbout FCPA
Review, Legal Times of Washington, Sept. 1, 1980, at 1, col. I.
133. Huffman, supra note 132, at 1. This author, however, tends to agree with the
view expressed by other lawyers that "[i]f a company has no problem, it doesn't need the
government to tell it that." Id (statement of Arthur Mathews). See also SEC Joins
Review Plan, supra note 132, at 10 (statement of John M. Fedders). Except perhaps in
close cases, the expense and delay of the review process would not seem to justify the
superfluous security of Justice Department approval.
134. Surrey & Popkin, supra note 108, at 11. The initial review releases substantiate
this view. See notes 109-21 supra and accompanying text. In each transaction reviewed,
it was apparent that the requesting party had taken abundant precautionary measures to
ensure that its conduct was beyond reproach and that Justice Department clearance
would be certain. The transactions did not raise issues as much as they served as models
of proper compliance conduct under the FCPA.
135. Huffman, supra note 132, at 1 (statement of Arthur Mathews).
136. Dep't of Justice Release (March 24, 1980), at 1.See generally notes 19-29 supra
and accompanying text.

80

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:57

FCPA with regard to specific business transactions; and (2) through

publication of the core of review requests and decisions, it provides
general guidance to the business community at large on the meaning
and application of the Act's anti-bribery provisions.
a. Individual Review

Ideally, individual review eliminates ambiguity by providing a
definitive statement of the government's position on the application

of a law to a particular course of action. Until recently, however, the
FCPA Review Procedure did not offer this advantage. Because of
divided enforcement responsibilities under the Act, those companies

under the jurisdiction of both the Justice Department and the SEC
could not rely solely upon Justice Department approval. Because
the SEC refused to participate in the administration of the Review
Procedure, 137 to formally coordinate its interpretation and enforcement of the Act with the Justice Department, 138 and to provide guidance on its own, 139 companies faced the possibility of being sued by

the SEC for actions previously cleared by the Criminal Division.
Thus the Review Procedure was only partly effective in resolving the

statute's ambiguities.
While the SEC indicated that it was "unlikely" that it would
take enforcement action against a party who had received a
favorable review letter, 140 the mere possibility that the Commission
might later take such action undercut any certainty that the Review
Procedure offered. Comment letters received by the SEC suggested

that the Commission's position was deterring many companies from
using the Review Procedure.' 4 ' Faced with increasing pressure to
137. Dep't of Justice Release (March 24, 1980), at 1. Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 34-17099, supra note 17, at 59,004.
138. The Commission has emphasized that while it does not formally coordinate its
interpretation and enforcement of the Act with the Justice Department, it "work[s]
closely with the Justice Department in administering the bribery prohibitions." Id at
59,005. The Commission asserts that it is "aware of no difference of substance between
the Commission and the Department of Justice with respect to interpretation of the bribery prohibitions." Id
139. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14478, Notification of Enactment of
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 43 Fed Reg. 7,752, 7,754 (1978).
140. Dept. of Justice Release (March 24, 1980), at 2.
141. On February 21, 1980, the Commission issued a statement requesting public
comment from issuers and other interested persons on the impact of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16593, supra note 125,
at 12,574. The Commission sought comments on the impediments the FCPA presents to
legitimate foreign commerce; what steps issuers have taken to comply with the Act;
whether there are recurring questions or concerns with respect to the interpretation of the
anti-bribery provisions; and what impact, if any, uncertainty may be having on competition in foreign markets. Id at 12,576. The SEC also sought to determine what steps it
should take to better administer the elements of the anti-bribery provisions, if any change
was necessary. Id
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cooperate in clarifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the SEC
modified its position in August 1980.142
The Commission stood by its refusal to participate in the
administration of the Review Procedure. It agreed, however, not to
prosecute any party for bribery violations who had received Justice
Department clearance before May 31, 1981.143 By that time, the Justice Department should have completed a study of the first year of
operation of the Review Procedure.44 After evaluating the Department's report, the Commission will reconsider its enforcement position and decide whether to continue its present policy, participate in
the Review Procedure, or take other appropriate action. 4 5 Though
only a provisional measure, the SEC's policy change eliminates a
major drawback of the Review Procedure and permits an assured
means of resolving ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
b.

General Guidance

While the SEC's new enforcement policy significantly enhances
the effectiveness of the individual review process, it does nothing to
improve the Review Procedure's ability to offer general guidance to
the business community at large. If the Procedure is to provide reliable general guidance, published review releases must reflect the
views and enforcement policies of both the SEC and the Justice
Department because each can bring enforcement actions under the
Only fourteen comments were received in response to the SEC's request. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-17099, supra note 17, at 59,004. These, however, included
statements by several major business associations, among them the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Foreign Trade Council and the Emergency Committee for
American Trade. Each urged the SEC to provide guidance on the FCPA and to coordinate its enforcement policy with the Department of Justice. Statement of the Chamber of
Commerce, supra note 13, at 1-2; letter of Richard W. Roberts, President, National Foreign Trade Council to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (May 27, 1980), at 4-5; letter of Charles S. Levy, Vice-President, Emergency
Committee for American Trade to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (June 30, 1980), at 2 (letters on file at the Cornell International
Law Journal). As one letter stated, "Comment. . . to the effect that Commission officials will provide 'constructive assistance, cooperation and help' to the Justice Department, it seems to us, will be insufficient to lay to rest all fears that a transaction approved
by one agency could be condemned by the other." Letter of Richard W. Roberts to
George A. Fitzsimmons, supra, at 5.
142. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-17099, supra note 17, at 59,002.
143. Id.
144. Id at 59,005. The study, requested by the President, will be conducted by both
the Justice Department and the Department of Commerce. It will include comments by
business and other interested parties on the effectiveness of the Review Procedure, as well
as recommendations on what further actions may be necessary to remove ambiguities in
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Statement on Reduction of Export Disincentives, 16
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 400, 402 (Mar. 3, 1980); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 11, at 11.
145. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-17099, supra note 17, at 59,005.
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Act. At present, review releases represent only the position of the
Justice Department. The SEC's policy to not sue companies that
receive favorable review letters does not imply agreement with Justice Department review decisions. Theoretically, the Commission
could bring an enforcement action against a company that relied on
a Justice Department decision but did not itself seek individual
review, even though the company's international transaction was
identical to the conduct previously approved. Thus at best, review
releases can only provide predictability as to how the Justice Department will apply the provisions of the FCPA.
Beyond the problems posed by the SEC's lack of participation
in the review process, a review procedure is simply not an appropriate mechanism to provide general guidance on a statute. As many
businessmen have argued, the precedential value of FCPA review
letters will be limited because they only represent the Justice Department's position on the application of the Act to the particular transaction under review. 146 Public releases describing the Department's
enforcement decisions are not likely to convey the Criminal Division's perception of the limits of legitimate conduct under the Act.
Slight changes in circumstances may result in a different enforcement decision. Further, if the Justice Department is to safeguard the
confidentiality of certain business transactions, facts that were critical to the Department's enforcement decision may sometimes have
to be deleted from published review releases. Thus, drawing analogies from review decisions will frequently be difficult-and dangerous.
In addition, published review releases are immutable and cannot be modified to reflect changes in government policy that will be
inevitable as the Justice Department gains more enforcement experience under the FCPA. The publication of policy changes will have
to await the submission of new review requests involving similar
conduct and issues under the Act. Businessmen relying on previous
review decisions in planning their international activities may sometimes be caught in transitional periods, during which they may find
themselves the first victims of enforcement policy changes by being
prosecuted for actions they reasonably believed to be sanctioned by
the Justice Department.
Finally, experience under the Antitrust Division's Business
Review Procedure has shown that the procedure is used far less than
the complexity of antitrust problems would seem to necessitate. 147 If
146. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11, at 9-9.
147. From 1968 to 1978, only 230 review requests were submitted under the Antitrust
Division Business Review Procedure, averaging fewer than 21 requests per year. Quee-
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the FCPA Review Procedure is also only rarely used, it could be
years before enough issues have been addressed under the Review
Procedure to provide meaningful general guidance to the business
community.14 8 While it is too early to determine whether the FCPA
Review Procedure will be generally ignored, to date the Justice
Department has not received a significant number of FCPA review

requests. 149
2. Usable Form
Several aspects of the Review Procedure make it an impractical
form of guidance to the business community. One problem cited

repeatedly by businessmen and lawyers is the public nature of the
Review Procedure.' 50 Because of the past adverse public reaction to
revelations about corporate bribery, 15 1 companies do not want their
names associated with questionable foreign payments.' 52 Thus

many firms are likely to shy away from a review procedure that
entails public disclosure of the names of requesting companies.
Some major corporations have in fact gone so far as to publicly deny
Practices Act while
the need for guidance on the Foreign Corrupt
1 3

privately indicating strong support for it.
The public nature of the Review Procedure may also reveal sensitive information to competitors. Competitors may glean information either through the Criminal Division's public releases or by
filing a request for disclosure under the Freedom of Information

Act. 154 Though the Justice Department has attempted to assure connan, Comparison of Foreign CorruptPracticesAct Draft Review Procedure With Antitrust
Business Review Procedure, NEW REViEW PROCEDURE I, supra note 41, at 391, 393.
148. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 11, at 9-9; Surrey & Popkin, supra note
108, at 11. Not only is the quantity of review requests important in this regard, but also
the questions the requests raise. The review releases published by the Justice Department thus far have been found by many lawyers to be of little help in clarifying the
FCPA. Huffman, Usefulness ofIntitialFCP4Letters Debated, Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 3, 1980, at 1, col. 2. The initial releases involved almost unimpeachable conduct, dictating almost certain approval by the Justice Department. See U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure Releases Nos. 80-01 to 80-04
(Oct. 29, 1980). If further releases are of a similar nature, it is unlikely that the Review
Procedure will prove to be a useful instrument in providing general guidance on the
FCPA. See also notes 109-21 supra and accompanying text.
149. SEC Joins Review Plan, supra note 132, at 10. See also note 37 supra.
150. See generally SEC Joins Review Plan, supra note 132, at 10; Surrey & Popkin,
supra note 108, at 10-11; Lempert, supra note 103, at 2.
151. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
152. Telephone interviews with members of the District of Columbia bar (Sept.
1979).
153. Id
154. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). For a more extensive discussion of Freedom of Information Act problems under the Review Procedure, see Friedman, Freedom ofInformation
Act Problems Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Review Procedure, NEw REVIEW
PROCEDURE II, supra note 5, at 45.
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fidentiality of sensitive information submitted to it, 155 the Department cannot guarantee that such information will not be disclosed.

As one Justice official stated, "[w]e cannot by regulation amend the
156
Freedom of Information Act."
Many lawyers and businessmen are worried that FOIA exemp-

tions will not provide sufficient protection against the disclosure of
the extensive documents and business information required in making FCPA review requests.1 57 They also fear that confidential infor-

mation cannot be kept from Congress if a committee or legislator
submits a proper request.' 58 The possibility of leaks via Congress

worries many companies, and congressional requests for information
are likely to be frequent if the problem of questionable foreign pay59
ments "continues to be a political football."
Further, the public nature of the review process exposes companies to potential litigation. A company employing the Review Procedure will have revealed its operations to shareholders, competitors
and other governmental units. This could expose it to liability on
two fronts. First, the Justice Department intends to share submitted
documents and information with the SEC and other government

departments and regulatory agencies. 160 This will enable other government units to engage in often unwarranted and certainly
unwanted searches for incriminating information both under the
FCPA and other laws. Second, the Act may create a private cause of

action for legal or equitable relief. Thus shareholders and competitors may be able to sue a company for injuries suffered as a result of
questionable payments, even if the Justice Department declined to
61
take enforcement action.'
155. See notes 99-105 supra and accompanying text.
156. Speech of Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, supra note 62, at 10.
157. Lempert, supra note 103, at 2.
158. Id A Justice Department official confirmed this problem, admitting that there
would probably be no way to prevent Congressional access to information once the
review process was complete. "Nor, perhaps," he stated, "should we want to prevent
access." Id
159. Id (statement of Charles J. Queenan, Jr.).
160. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
161. The SEC stated that "the legislative history of the Act . . .contemplates that
private rights of action properly could be implied under the Act on behalf of persons who
suffer injury as a result of prohibited conduct." SEC Release No. 34-14478, supra note
139, at 7,754. This view was reiterated by SEC Special Counsel Frederick B. Wade, who
added "that 'private enforcement' of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act would provide 'a
necessary supplement' to enforcement actions brought by either the Commission or the
Department of Justice and that the implication of a private right of action would be
appropriate 'to make effective the Congressional purpose."' Letter from Frederick B.
Wade to Mr. Raymond Garcia, Emergency Comm. for American Trade, Washington,
D.C. (May 16, 1978), reprintedin [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,701, at 80,806
(footnotes omitted). But see Note, .4CongressionalResponse to the Problem of Questionable CorporatePayments Abroad" The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977, 10 L. &
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As previously discussed, 162 the Criminal Division's authority to

demand supporting documents and to conduct an independent
investigation also undermines the usability of the Review Procedure.
Especially in this delicate area, companies will be very reluctant to
give the government virtually unlimited access to company records.
Not only might an investigation uncover damaging documents relating to the proposed transaction, but it might also draw attention to
questionable past transactions.
A related problem is the Review Procedure's requirement that a
review request "contain in detail all relevant and material information bearing on . . . the circumstances of the proposed" transac-

tion. 63 This requirement may oblige a company to reveal its
knowledge that, for example, a particular sales agent has previously
made "pass-through" payments to government officials. If some
payments were made on behalf of the company (even without its
knowledge or approval at the time), the company would be essentially precluded from submitting a review request. To do so would
expose it to possible enforcement actions by the Justice Department
and the SEC. Further, if the company submits a review request
without revealing its knowledge of and/or participation in the payments, and the Justice Department later discovers this "oversight,"
64
the company would lose the protection afforded by a review letter. 1
Considering the extent of questionable payments made by American
companies before 1977,165 a requirement that firms disclose "all
material information bearing on. . . the circumstances of the pro-

posed" transaction may significantly deter many companies from
using the Procedure.
The high cost of seeking review of a business transaction further
undercuts the practicability of the Review Procedure. The costs of
submitting a review request and complying with subsequent Justice
Department demands for additional information and documents can
be substantial. The burden of such costs is especially onerous to
small companies, or when the value of the business transaction is
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1253, 1288-92 (1978); Note, Effective Enforcement ofthe Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 563-67 (1980).
162. See notes 78, 80 & 131 supra and accompanying text.
163. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(f)) (emphasis
added). See Surrey & Popkin, supra note 108, at 11.
164. A review letter is binding upon the Justice Department only to the extent that the
requesting party's disclosure of information is accurate and complete. 45 Fed. Reg.
20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(k)).
165. At the time Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, over 400 American companies had admitted making questionable or illegal foreign and domestic payments. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977). The companies, including 117
of the Fortune 500 firms, paid more than $300 million to foreign government officials,
politicians and political parties. Id
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relatively low. Faced with the already high costs of instituting
FCPA compliance programs and accounting controls, companies
may often find it more sensible to rely on the advice of private counsel or simply forego an export opportunity, rather than seek Justice
Department review of a matter.
Finally, the dynamics of business negotiations often will not
permit lengthy delays to determine the Justice Department's position
on a proposed course of conduct. 166 Timing is often crucial to the
conclusion of business agreements. Delays may enable foreign competitors who are not subject to anti-bribery laws to gain an advantage in negotiations. Further, constantly changing conditions may
require modification of business proposals made several months previously, thus causing extended Justice Department review and possibly inspiring new demands by foreign officials. While the Review
Procedure may be suitable to some kinds of business transactions,
those requiring decisiveness and speedy action will not be amenable
to consideration under the review process.
V
SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE REVIEW
PROCEDURE AND ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF GUIDANCE

A. SUGGESTED CHANGES
The drawbacks of the Review Procedure seriously diminish its
effectiveness in providing guidance on the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. Some of the drawbacks, such as the cost and time required to
seek review of a transaction, are inherent in any review procedure
and cannot be readily eliminated. Some problems, such as the Criminal Division's authority to request supporting documents, could be
solved, but only at the expense of the integrity of the Review Procedure. 167 The amelioration of two problems, however, would result in
a much more valuable and practicable review scheme.
166. The Review Procedure provides for a seemingly expeditious response to review
requests. "The Criminal Division will make every reasonable effort to respond . . .
within 30 days after receipt of the review request and of any requested additional information and documents." 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.18(i)). In fact, however, requests for "additional information" may be extensive and
cause the review process to last for months. One year after the Review Procedure was
begun, the Justice Department had issued only four review releases. See notes 109-21
supra and accompanying text.
167. The Review Procedure could be restyled along the lines of the "no-action letters"
offered by the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.81, 202.2 (1980). Under this procedure, review
decisions are based only upon information submitted by companies in their review
requests. The SEC has no authority to request supporting documents or to conduct an
independent investigation. While such a procedure might be useful in clarifying some
ambiguities, it would often be unable to provide reliable answers to questions on the
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SEC Participation

The Securities and Exchange Commission must join in the
administration of the Review Procedure. Its refusal to participate in
the review process is one of the Procedure's most serious defects.
Until review letters and releases express the interpretative and
enforcement views of both the Justice Department and the SEC, the
Review Procedure can only be partly effective in clarifying the ambiguities of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Formal SEC participation in the review process would create an
assured means of determining the government's enforcement intentions with regard to specific business transactions. It would greatly
enhance the Review Procedure's ability to offer general guidance to
the business community, and it would help guarantee that Justice
Department and SEC interpretation and enforcement is uniform and
consistent with congressional intent.
The President cannot force the SEC to join in the administration of the Review Procedure. If the Commission cannot be persuaded to do so voluntarily, then Congress should enact legislation
mandating SEC participation. Alternatively, the SEC should be
divested of its enforcement responsibility under section 103 of the
FCPA and all enforcement power for the Act's anti-bribery provisions should be consolidated in the Justice Department. Legislation
that would accomplish this goal has recently been introduced in the
168
Senate.
2. Public Nature of the Review Process
The Justice Department should provide for maximum confidentiality of review proceedings. Until firms can submit review requests
without fear that the identity of the requesting party and the specifics
of its proposed conduct will become publicly known, most compaFCPA. Because factual circumstances and the knowledge and intent of company officials play such an important part in the application of the statute, adequate Justice
Department review may require more detailed information than companies would usually submit.
168. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S.2763, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S5875 (daily ed. May 28, 1980). The bill, introduced by Senator John Chaffee, is intended to "provide the groundwork for a necessary and thorough
review of the act, and lead to important changes without compromising the original
intent of the act." Id at S5875. If passed, the bill would instruct the Justice Department
to provide compliance guidance to U.S. business; designate the Justice Department the
sole enforcer of corrupt practices; include a "materiality" standard in the accounting
section; and call for the negotiation of an international agreement on corrupt practices.
Id
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nies will refrain from using the Review Procedure. Though the Justice Department has attempted to furnish some protection to
requestiag parties, 169 it has not gone far enough. Ideally, the review
process should be entirely confidential. Inter-agency sharing of

information and FOIA submissions, however, make this goal illusory. Even so, certain actions can be taken to minimize the public
disclosure of review proceedings.

First, review releases should not disclose the names of parties
involved in proposed transactions, the nature of the requesting company's business, or the country in which the proposed conduct is to
take place. 70 The Review Procedure can provide general guidance

to the business community without this information, and it only
brings unwarranted attention to requesting parties and their business
associates. Instead, releases should be of a hypothetical nature, concentrating on the business practice in question and the Criminal
Division's enforcement decision. To disguise transactions even fur-

ther, the Criminal Division should publish a release well after it
issues a review letter. Releases could be published together on a
quarterly or semi-annual basis.
Second, the Justice Department should permit companies to

seek return of sensitive documents after the Criminal Division
reviews them.' 7 ' By allowing companies to remove such materials
from the possession and control of the Justice Department, the documents would be insulated from disclosure under the Freedom of

Information Act. 172 Obviously, the Department will not want to
relinquish control over all documents a company desires to
169. See notes 99-105 supra and accompanying text.
170. The safeguard against naming the country involved could be relaxed when the
Criminal Division has determined that a specific position in a particular country is "ministerial or clerical" in nature, but only when disclosing the name of the country would not
risk revealing the identities of the parties involved in the transaction.
171. See Friedman, supra note 154, at 55-56. Alternatively, companies could merely
provide the Criminal Division access to the documents and never actually release them
to the government. Id.
172. Under the Freedom of Information Act, government agencies are required only
to disclose "agency records." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). Agency records are those documents in the physical possession or control of a government agency. Kissinger v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 151 (1980). If an agency has
not chosen to retain possession or control of a document, it need not disclose it. Id at
151-52.
In a paper on this subject, one author concludes that while the practice of seeking
return of a document is an effective means of protecting information from public disclosure, "in view of the balance sought to be struck between confidentiality and providing
guidance to the business community, it is unlikely that the Department of Justice would
permit such a procedure." Friedman, supra note 154, at 56. Given the reduced role this
Article has suggested the Review Procedure play in providing general guidance on the
FCPA, however, this would no longer be a valid objection.

FCP, REVIEW PROCEDURE

1981]

reclaim. 73 A procedure should thus be established to enable companies to negotiate the return of selected documents in advance of their
submission. 74 Such a practice should meet the Justice Department's
need for detailed information on a proposed transaction a' well as
the desire of companies to protect sensitive material from public disclosure.
Finally, the Justice Department should construe FOIA confidentiality exemptions liberally. While courts are the final arbiters of
FOIA requests, the Justice Department's treatment of "confidential"
information and its established practice for obtaining needed information in the future can be important factors in court decisions in
FOIA cases.175 The Justice Department's protective policy and consistent practice would set an important precedent in court deliberations.
Admittedly, even these measures will not solve all the problems
associated with the public nature of the review process. Information
on review requests will still be available to other departments and
regulatory agencies, 76 and the public will still have access to some
information that firnms hope to keep confidential. These changes
should, however, go a long way toward addressing some of the business community's major concerns.

B.

ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF GUIDANCE

While the changes suggested above would substantially improve
its effectiveness, the Review Procedure alone is not a sufficient form
of guidance. Time constraints, high legal costs, the government's
authority to demand supporting documents and conduct an
independent investigation, congressional and agency access to confidential information, and incomplete protection under the Freedom
of Information Act will still deter many companies from submitting
review requests. Additionally, the Review Procedure is unsuited to
provide reliable general guidance on the meaning and application of
173. At minimum, the Justice Department will want to retain those documents that
establish the basic circumstances of the transaction under review. That information
would be needed to prove that the circumstances have changed or that the company's
disclosure was inaccurate or incomplete, should the Justice Department later decide to
prosecute a requesting party.
174. Documents a requesting party might wish to retain include both information that
would not be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and information that would be exempt but is so sensitive that a company would also not want it
readily available to others within the government.
175. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. M6rton, 498 F.2d 765, 768, 770
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
176. If the Securities and Exchange Commission joins in the administration of the
Review Procedure and is bound by review decisions, this drawback would not be as
severe.
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the Act's anti-bribery provisions. 177 As a consequence, without other
means of guidance, businesses will be left to flounder in the ambiguities of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and trade losses will continue to mount.
Because of these problems, the Justice Department and the
Securities and Exchange Commission should together give renewed
consideration to the Commerce Department's recommendation to
offer both a business review procedure and a compendium of substantive guidelines and hypotheticals. 7 8 Such a dual form of guidance would provide business with the government's general

position on troublesome areas of the FCPA and, if that is sometimes
insufficient, with its official reaction to a company's specific proposed
conduct.
The Commerce Department's suggested FCPA guidelines cover

79
six major areas of ambiguity in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 1
The guidelines include a summary and explication of the Act's relevant provisions in each area, followed by analyses of illustrative
business transactions. 80 The Antitrust Division,' 8 ' the Department

of Commerce, 182 and the Department of the Treasury'

83

presently

177. See notes 146-49 supra and accompanying text.
178. See note 128 supra and accompanying text. This author's support of the Commerce Department's recommendation does not imply approval of the specific guidelines
proposed by the Department, which were only preliminary in nature. The guidelines, see
notes 179-80 infra and accompanying text, do not sufficiently clarify all the ambiguities
previously outlined in this Article or others identified by the legal and business communities. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. See generally REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT,

supra note 11, at 9-4 to 9-8.

179. These areas include: (I) contributions to candidates or political parties; (2) business entertainment and promotional gifts; (3) company liability for the acts of its officers,
directors, employees or agents; (4) company liability for payments to intermediaries and
"reason to know;" (5) payments to instrumentalities of foreign governments' and (6)
grease payments, expediting payments and payments to clerical or ministerial employees.
Draft Guidance Materials, note 128 supra. The Commerce Department omitted the fifth
area ("payments to instrumentalities of foreign governments") from the draft because it
had not yet developed an approach it considered satisfactory. Id
180. In most instances the guidelines are based directly on relevant provisions of the
Act or statements contained in its legislative history. Id In some cases, however, distinctions or presumptions are introduced that are not mentioned either in the Act or in its
legislative history. These distinctions and presumptions, the draft asserts, "are consistent
with the provisions of the Act, as well as its legislative history, and are needed in order to
guide enforcement policies within the Department, as well as compliance with the Act by
firms and individuals, in areas where the Act is silent or ambiguous." Id
181. ANTITRUST GUIDE, note 44 supra. The Guide includes fourteen fact situations
illustrating recurrent international business transactions, followed by detailed analyses of
the antitrust problems they raise and the Division's enforcement position on these
problems. The Guide was generally well received by legal commentators. See, e.g.,
Baker, note 44 supra; Fugate, The DepartmentofJustice'sAntitrust Guidefor International
Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977); Griffin, note 44 supra.
182. Department of Commerce Antiboycott Regulations, note 43 supra. The
antiboycott regulations offer an extensive summary and explication of the foreign boycott
provisions of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, tit. II,
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offer similar compendiums of guidelines and hypotheticals. These
guidelines deal with very complex areas of law that have posed
counselling problems as difficult as those under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Thus, this form of guidance would seem equally
appropriate for clarification of the FCPA.
Publication of substantive guidelines and hypotheticals would
forewarn the business community of the kinds of conduct that would
raise anti-bribery problems and provoke enforcement action.
Equally as important, they would clarify what business practices
would not be challenged. Guidelines would provide a coherent
statement of the Justice Department's and the SEC's interpretation
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and they would promote public discussion of the government's enforcement views. Further,
guidelines and hypotheticals would offer companies the advantage of
not having to publicly disclose their proposed business transactions;
they would avoid the costs and delays of a business review procedure; they would not involve government examination of company
records; and they could be modified and expanded as government
policy changes.
The Justice Department has criticized the use of substantive
guidelines and hypotheticals in this area because of the lack of judicial interpretation of the FCPA. 184 The Department also feels that
it has not had enough enforcement experience under the Act to write
authoritative hypotheticals. 185 This, however, is precisely why such
guidance is needed. With few court decisions and enforcement
actions to guide the business community, companies are at a loss to
determine how the Act's ambiguous provisions will be applied.
Although the Justice Department finds it difficult to interpret the Act
without case law, U.S. businesses must interpret the FCPA with
every international transaction. If the Justice Department and the
91 Stat. 235, as amendedby Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420
(Supp. III 1979). The regulations include up to thirty-two brief, illustrative examples of
definitions, prohibited conduct and other provisions of the statute, as well as lengthier
supplemental "interpretations" of illustrative conduct.
183. Department of the Treasury Boycott Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 3,454 (1978); 44
Fed. Reg. 66,272 (1979). The boycott guidelines consist of a series of questions and
answers based on hypotheticals relating to fifteen areas of the international boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 999. The boycott guidelines and the
antiboycott regulations have come under criticism from the business community because
of conflicts in their interpretation of the boycott laws. While some of those conflicts have
been resolved, others still remain. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note
II, at 9-15 to 9-18. To avoid this problem, it is essential that the Justice Department and
the SEC coordinate their interpretations of the FCPA. Conflicting guidance will only
increase uncertainty.
184. See notes 51, 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
185. Id
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SEC are able to make enforcement decisions without judicial assistance, then they should be able to advise the business community of

their interpretations of the FCPA through substantive guidelines. 86
While these guidelines would not carry the weight of judicial authority, they would provide some insight into the enforcement policies of
the Justice Department and the SEC-the practical basis on which
87
business decisions are made.1

Especially in this period of apprehension about the meaning
and application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the publication
of substantive guidelines and hypotheticals seems necessary and
urgent. While guidelines and hypotheticals may be too general to be
useful in some instances, when combined with a business review pro-

cedure, they offer an important and practicable means of guidance to
the business community.
CONCLUSION

The objectives of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are important ones and there is substantial support for them in the business

community. But uncertainty as to the meaning and application of
the Act has dulled that support. The Act has become an impediment

to legitimate international trade, stifling initiative and encumbering
business transactions.
Laws are never free from ambiguity. The compromises they
reflect, the language in which they are written, and their need to

encompass the unanticipated, all tend to make laws susceptible to
varying interpretations. But if people are to conform their activity to
a law, they must know what it says. Thus it should be the desire and
the duty of government to clarify the ambiguities in the Foreign Cor-

rupt Practices Act.
186. The Commerce and Treasury Departments both provided guidance on the
antiboycott laws under similar circumstances. See notes 182-83 supra and accompanying
text.
187. Some business associations, including the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States and the National Association of Manufacturers, have opposed the publication of a
compendium of guidelines and hypotheticals. Statement of the Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 13, at 2; Telephone interview with a spokesperson of the National Association
of Manufacturers (Sept. 4, 1979). Many businessmen fear that the Justice Department
may interpret the Act so as to make it more restrictive. Singer, supra note 11, at 1864-65.
This fear may be a valid one. But even if it proves to be true, businessmen will still have
the opportunity to change the SEC's and Justice Department's interpretations through
reasoned public persuasion. Further, companies may always challenge these interpretations in court if they are charged with an FCPA violation. The essential point, however,
is that the Justice Department and the SEC will hold these interpretations regardless of
whether they release them to the public. It is better that the interpretations be openly
disclosed rather than sprung upon an unsuspecting-and confused-business community.
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The FCPA Review Procedure is one step toward this goal. In
its present form, however, it is far from reaching that goal. The Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission must
join together to remedy the defects of the Review Procedure and
reexamine the alternative means of providing guidance on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Only then can a satisfactory solution be
found to meeting the criticisms of the Act.
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